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NOTES

SPECIAL FINDINGS OR SPECIAL VERDICTS
By
HON. JOHN J. PENTZ*

With the promulgation of Civil Procedural Rule 2257, and a comment upon
the use of such rule in Brown v. Ambridge Yellow Cab Co.,' the use of special
findings and special verdicts comes up again to trouble the trial judge. The recent
case of Ratcliff v. Myers, 2 suggests the use of the special findings might have been
beneficial in that case.
Whether or not special findings, or a special verdict, have all of the benefits
and desirabilities extolled in the appellate court decisions, remains to be seen.
Much of the difficulty in the past has arisen from the failure to distinguish
between a special verdict, and special findings, as well as the circumstances wherein such use is desirable, or undesirable, and whether the issue can be readily defined, is comparatively simple, or is complex and interdependent upon other is-

sues.
In a special verdict, the jury finds all the facts in the case, disputed as well
as undisputed, and leaves the ultimate decision on those facts to the Court. Special
findings accompany a general verdict, and serve as an aid in clarifying the facts
and issues, which are disposed of by the general verdict.
Judge Keller, in Fulforth v. Prud. Ins. Co.,8 says, on page 523 of his opinion, concerning a special verdict:
"It is very similar to a case stated, except that the facts are found by
the jury instead of agreed to and stated by the parties; and, like a case
stated, the court in pronouncing judgment cannot go beyond the facts
found in the special verdict and infer anything not there found. What
is not found is presumed not to exist. If the facts found are not sufficient to suport a judgment, the case must be tried again."
The full definition, as expressed in Standard Sewing Machine Company v.
Royal Insurance Co.,4 is as follows:
"Nothing is better settled, on principle as well as authority, than
that all the facts upon which the court is to pronounce judgment should
be incorporated in the special verdict. It is the exclusive province of the
jury, in the first place, to determine all disputed questions of fact, from
the evidence before thei; and then their special verdict is made up of
those findings of fact, together with such undisputed facts as may be
necessary to a just decision of the cause. . .. The court, in considering
a special verdict and entering judgment thereon, is necessarily confined
to the facts found and embodied in the verdict; the latter cannot be aided
by intendment or extrinsic facts that may appear in the evidence."
President Judge, Forty-sixth Judicial District
1 374 Pa. 208, 97 A. 2d 377 (1953).
2 382 Pa. 196, 113 A. 2d. 558 (1955).
8 147 Pa. Super. 516, 24 A. 2d 749 (1942).
4 201 Pa. 645, 51 Atd. 354 (1902).
*
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Special findings are not defined to any length. They should accompany a
general verdict at all times. They are more commonly used than the special verdict,
but when used have been as defective in application as the special verdict. Both are
excellent in theory, but exceedingly troublesome in practice.
The special verdict was apparently designed for those situations in which the
jury found certain facts, after which the Court determined whether under the law,
the plaintiff had a case, or the defendant had a defense. This was first summarized
and defined in Wallingford v. Dunlap,' decided in 1850, as follows:
"A special verdict is where the jury find the facts of the case, leaving the ultimate decision of the cause upon those facts, to the court, concluding conditionally, that if upon the whole matter thus found, the court
should be of opinion that the plaintiff had a good cause of action, they
then find for the plaintiff, and assess his damages; if otherwise, then
for the defendant: 3 Black 378; Boote on Suit at Law, 158."
In Pgh. Ft. Wayne & Chicago R. R. v. Evans,6 decided in 1867, the special ver-

dict idea was applied, and is an excellent example of the difficulties created by
such use, in a case of negligence and contributory negligence, with several facts
dependent upon conflicting testimony. The Supreme Court through Justice Woodward, states on page 254:
"Negligence is generally a mixed question of law and fact, and what
renders special verdicts so proper in these railroad cases is, that if they ascertain all the material facts, the undisputed as well as the disputed, the
question of negligence then becomes exclusively a question of law, and
may be dealt with accordingly. This is a much better way of trying causes
than to leave to the jury the application of the law to the facts, for outof this grows the practice of some judges of wholly committing the question of negligence to the jury. However, as the court undertook to instruct the jury upon the law of negligence in this case, and they decided
that a sufficient head-light and a flagman were wanting, hereby showing that they meant to pass upon the subject of negligence, the instructions
should have been more full, - - to this effect:"

Justice Woodward then poses a dozen or more questions which must be determined, and whether or not these constitute negligence or contributory negligence,
as the answers thereto are found by the jury, and leaves to the trial court, the ultimate decision on negligence as an abstract proposition, a legal concept long since
out of date. An attempt was made in Kelchner v. Nanticoke Boro., 7 to pass upon
a question of negligence, and experienced the same difficulty as in the Evans case.
The question of the negligence of the defendant was not submitted to the jury,
the same fault occurring in the Evans case.
So, in Simpson v. Montgomery Ward,8 an action for damages for malicious

prosecution, the Supreme Court, pointing out that in civil actions for malicious
5 14 Pa. 31 (1850).
6 53 Pa. 250 (1867).
'7209 Pa. 412, 58 Atd. 851 (1904).
8 354 Pa. 87, 46 A. 2d 674 (1946).
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prosecution the question of want of probable cause for the criminal prosecution
which gave rise to the civil action, is a question, not for the jury, but for the court.
Therefore, in such a case, where there is a conflict in testimony concerning the
circumstances of the case, the trial court has two courses to follow, one, submit the
testimony to a jury to find a special verdict, under proper and sufficient instructions and findings, within the requirements laid down in the lVallingford and
Fulforth cases or (by inference) upon specific findings of fact, that is, special
findings accompanying a general verdict. The case was then sent back for another
trial, recommending to the trial judge the use of special findings, and suggesting
certain questions or findings to be submitted to the jury.
Unfortunately, at the second trial (appearing after appeal, as Simpson v.
Montgomery Ward,) 9 the trial judge submitted eight special findings, which did
not reach the question of want of probable cause sufficiently to permit the court
to determine whether or not want of probable cause existed. One of the questions,
or findings, as submitted, as pointed out by the Superior Court, was not responsive,
obviously confused the jury, and was also contradictory to another finding. The
case then went back, was tried again, the special findings reduced to two in number,
proper in form and purpose, and was finally affirmed.1 0
Theoretically, a special verdict, or special findings, seem to be an excellent vehicle by which a case, its issue, or issues, and the testimony pertinent thereto, can
be clarified, simplified and presented to a jury to -be passed upon with some degree
of judgment and logic, on the part of the jurors.
However, when the trial judge finds, or thinks he finds, that one purely legal
issue controls the case on trial, and with or without suggestion from counsel, he
attempts to simplify matters by a special verdict, or to unravel complex facts, or
mixed questions of law and fact, by a special verdict, or special findings, his
trouble begins. He must decide if it is relevant to the issue, helpful, readily comprehensible and susceptible of a brief reply? With zealous counsel suggesting,
or insisting upon the phrasing; which facts control the issue; what issue is involved; what the law is; which testimony proves what; and with said zealous counsel seeking every advantage, real or fancied (the fancied ones causing most of the
trouble); it is no wonder he flounders around and produces nothing but reversible
error.
The many disasters no doubt prompted former Chief Justice Robert Von
Moschzisker's comment, on page 242 of his "Trial by Jury",
... "but, I suppose, the difficulty with this suggestion is that many trial
judges are not masters of the art of administering the law, and, in most
cases, they would get but poor aid from the bar, few lawyers being skilled
in court practice, hence the effort might end in confusion worse confounded."
9 162 Pa. Super. 371, 57 A. 2d 571 (1948).
10 Simpson v. Montgomery Ward, 165 Pa. Super 408, 68 A. 2d 442 (1949).
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One can only wonder if the Chief Justice ever experienced the difficulties the
trial judge undergoes when he attempts the special verdict, or to unravel things
by special findings.
Dare it be suggested that the Chief Justice was too limited in his reference
to the judiciary? Bertinelli v. Galoni,1 1 gives a right to special findings to a litigant, and refusal thereof as possible reversible error. In Sebastianelliv. Prudentia
Ins. Co., 12 it is said if a special finding is irreconcilable with the general verdict,
3
the special finding must prevail; but in Brawn v. Ambridge Taxicab Co.,' just

the opposite. In Simpson v. Montgomery Ward,14 an excellent treatise on the law
of civil actions for malicious prosecution, the special verdict is discussed in detail.
Special findings are suggested, but no direction as to either, is given. It took
two more trials by jury, and two more appeals to get out of the fog, and end the
litigation.
A great many of the errors committed, resulted from attempts to use special
verdicts, or special findings, in the wrong place, and frequently, without a clear
distinction between the special verdict and special findings, as will be noted from
the cases cited. The special verdict can be cumbersome and involved, except in the
simplest sort of factual situation. In Harrison v. Prudential Ins. Co.1 5 the only
question to be resolved was the date of birth of the insured. With this date fixed,
the court could readily calculate the amount to be paid the beneficiary. In the
Fulforth case, counsel agreed upon the special findings to be submitted, upon
which the court then entered judgment, or final verdict. These were both actions
of assumpsit and, in the latter case, Judge Keller noted that special findings were
agreed upon by counsel, although departing from observance of the rules of practice; but such a course had been sanctioned in Union Trust Co. v. Gilpin;,16 and

O'Boyle v. Kelly."'
A final verdict by a jury is the most desirable; the whole case not only should
be, but must be considered by the jury, and whether that finality is reached by
a jury, or the court, it must be upon consideration of the wholecase, all the testimony, and all the law involved. Special verdicts, or special findings, are too apt
to break the case in its several parts, and attract consideration by piece-meal,
rather than as a whole. It is only when the issue is but one, quite clear, and the testimony excluded to all except that issue, that these special mechanisms can be used
without reversible error. Frequently, as in Kelchner v. Nanticoke Boro.,' 8 where it
was not clear whether the trial court was submitting the case on a special verdict, or
11

331 Pa. 73, 200 AtI. 58 (1938).

12 337 Pa. 466, 12 A. 2d 113 (1940).

13
14
15
16
17

374
354
168
235
249
1s 209

Pa. 208, 97 A. 2d 377 (1953).
Pa. 87, 86 A. 2d 674 (1946).
Pa. Super. 474, 79 A. 2d 115 (1951).
Pa. 524, 84 Atd. 448 (1912).
Pa. 13, 94 At. 448 (1915).
Pa. 412, 58 Atd. 851 (1904).
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special findings, the finding upon one question submitted, by the jury, inevitably
brought other questions for determination, requiring the jury's return to the
jury room for further consideration; and in Benzinger v. Prudential Ins. Co., 19
brought about the jury reaching their final verdict in open court. Aside from that,
in both cases, the consideration of the jury upon the whole case was broken, and the
jury considered only the selected portions of the evidence, or if all the testimony
was considered, portion by portion.
Brown v. Ambridge Yellow Cab. Co., 20 is the latest case in the books- on
special verdicts and findings, and an excellent guide is set forth on page 217:
"Special findings have their use where the case involves a number
of different parties, standing in different relation to the matter in issue,
e. g., where there are an original defendant and additional defendant or
defendants: see Rule 2257, Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure. There
can also be an element of helpfulness in special findings where the conflict on a material issue of fact is absolute and categorical, such as whether
a thing is white or black, but once the issue slips into distinctions between
the grays and the tints, between twilight and dusk or daybreak and dawn,
shades of variance appear where requests for special findings will produce confusion rather than clarity, doubt rather than certainty, inconclusiveness rather than finality."
In this case, there were seventeen special findings, indicating some confusion
at the trial, between a special verdict, or special findings. Th questions, or findings, referred to in Justice Musmanno's opinion, are excellent examples of what
not to say in a special finding, and how easily the trial judge can create confusions and contradictions. One can vision the struggle that must have taken place
when these seventeen questions were being framed during the trial, under the
influences mentioned earlier. When the time (often fatal) comes at which special findings are to be prepared, should the trial judge retire to chambers with
respective counsel and thus in leisure and comfortably seated produce obfuscation, or should he compel counsel to stand on their feet, before the bench in the
court room, and suggest? He had better leave it all alone, and give the case to the
jury in the tried and true method. Always, the trial judge has the motion for non
suit, binding instructions, judgment n. o. v. or new trial. Relying on these, he
commits less error than using special findings, or special verdicts, as the reports
will amply attest.
If the issue is, "is it black", or "is it white", and the testimony addressed to
that, or counsel agree, well and good; otherwise, extraordinary care must be
exercised if the attempt is essayed, and it will be better if it is not.
The Brown case suggests the use of Civil Procedural Rule 2257, in defining
the various parties, their rights and liabilities, and their standing in the different
19, 317 Pa. 561, 176 At. 922 (1935).
20 374 Pa. 208, 97 A. 2d 377 (1953).
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relations to the matters in issue. This rule might have been applied in the Ratcliff
case, but again, great care would have had to be exercised. The pre-trial conference should be used, and if special findings, or special verdicts, are indicated,
there will be ample time to fully consider the possibilities; then clear away most
of the confusion by stipulation, and not use special findings.
All the cases, from the Wallingforth case to the Brown case, affirm and
reaffirm the desirability of special findings, but all the cases, except the three or
four mentioned, demonstrate that no matter how desirable, the results have been
just the opposite.

